

Event details

Date of incident: 08.06.26

Location of incident: Edenbridge Station

Discipline: Works Delivery Track

Event description:

During wheeltimber renewal works near Edenbridge Town Station all Controllers of Site Safety (COSS) reported that teams had signed out with the Engineering Supervisor (ES). The ES handed the worksite back to the Person in Charge of Possession (PICOP).

Shortly afterwards, two staff members were identified still walking off track. The individuals stated they had completed checks and left site independently.

Investigation so far has identified that there was shift changeover failure. The planned COSS was not yet available on site so the team temporarily booked on with another COSS. When the planned COSS arrived, the intended handover of responsibility did not occur effectively. Neither COSS retained clear accountability, and both left site.

Who was involved? Works Delivery Track

Any injuries and updates on persons involved: No injuries sustained

Time of incident: 00:40

Route: Sussex

Don't Wait – Act Now!

Whilst the investigation is ongoing, we do not need to wait to act.

Some simple reminders:

- **COSS Handover:** A robust handover must be undertaken between each COSS
- **Conductor Rail Permit (CRP):** Any COSS in receipt of a CRP must ensure:
 - All staff are clear of the worksite
 - The line is safe to return to service before returning the permit to the Engineering Supervisor (ES).
- **Work must stop without COSS:** All staff are to STOP work immediately if the COSS is not present and escalate through the appropriate channels.
- **No paperwork = no work:** If there is no valid SSOW pack or CRP, work must NOT proceed under any circumstances.

Initial causes identified:

- No single COSS maintained clear, continuous responsibility for the team, both COSSs assumed responsibility had transferred or ended as no effective handover was undertaken.
- COSS handed back his permit with two members of staff remaining on track.

Key issues for the investigation to consider:

- Suitability of the COSS handovers and communication between the 2 COSS on site
- The management of the handover shift
- The planning of the railway Safe System of Work (SSOW)
- How work teams were allocated to the COSS for the interim period and the incumbent shift

Immediate actions taken

- Competencies suspended
- Statements taken from all involved parties
- Investigator assigned

Could this happen in another location: Yes

DCP: Aaron Scudder

Level of investigation: Level 1